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Abstract The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for eco-
nomic growth. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research,
applied research, innovation and growth? In a common law system an explicitly dynamic
macroeconomic analysis is appropriate. This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of
patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-
ladder growth model with endogenous skill acquisition. We focus on two issues: (a) the over-
protection versus the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b)
the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. We
show that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical
assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation
always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. We also provide a simple “rule of
thumb” indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power.
Keywords Endogenous growth · Basic and applied research ·
Endogenous technological change · Common law
JEL Classification O31 · O33 · O34
1 Introduction
Is an increase in the intellectual protection of basic research beneficial or harmful1 for inno-
vation and growth? It is well known that the US economy in the 1980s witnessed a strengthen-
1 Heller and Eisenberg (1998) suggested the existence of a tragedy of the anticommons, i.e. a proliferation of
upstream intellectual property rights which greatly amplify the transaction costs of downstream research and
development, thus hampering downstream research for biomedical advance.
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ing of intellectual property rights (IPR). Given the weaker initial protection of basic research
results prevailing in the US until the early 1980s, this implied an increase in the relative bar-
gaining power of the upstream innovators, and therefore a decrease in the relative bargaining
power of the downstream innovators (i.e. applied researchers or developers).
This paper will show that an increase in the relative bargaining power of basic researchers
has harmful short-run consequences for economic growth, even though it could be conducive
to higher growth in the longer term. In fact, being basic and applied research endogenous,
they respond to the underlying relative bargaining power of the upstream innovators in two
opposite ways: R&D reallocates more upstream, thereby slowing down the pace of innovation
for a while. As a consequence, econometric studies may end up wrongly detecting negative
short-term effects of basic research on innovation and growth, with potentially misleading
research policy implications. Therefore, by focussing on the composition effects of patent
strength, we can explain the weak effects of stronger IPR on total R&D and on growth, often
found in the data. This analysis is related to the existing literature on basic research and
economic growth, such as Gersbach et al. (2010, 2012), and Spinesi (2007, 2012), however
here the focus is on the evolution of the private incentives for basic research by universities
or other institutions. Unlike Aghion and Howitt (1996) and Chu et al. (2012), here basic
research is not associated with horizontal innovation, but it co-exists with applied research
in a quality ladder framework.
We will cast our analysis in a dynamic general equilibrium framework, to better capture
all innovation-related features of the economy. We shall see how the normative assignment
of relative bargaining power of basic versus applied researcher is also related to the returns
to education. However, in our analysis, tracking the dynamics of the skill premium and
endogenizing education is only instrumental to a better screening of the short- and long-
term effects of basic research incentives on economic growth. A theory of functional income
inequality should instead consider that R&D employment is only a fraction of the total
employment of college workers, as in Galor and Moav (2000) model in which skills are
endogenous, and the demand for schooling is increasing with ability-biased technological
change; and as in Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and Kiley (1999), which show that education
increases the market for the skill complementary inputs, thereby driving up the profitability
of innovations that increase the productivity of the skilled and therefore the returns to higher
education.
In the microstructure of our model, a two-stage cumulative innovation structure is devel-
oped: unlike Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Green and Scotchmer (1995) we consider
free entry by a multitude of firms. Differently from Bessen and Maskin (2009) analysis of
sequential R&D with complementary innovation, our approach features creative destruction.
Unlike Chu’s (2010a, 2010b) unambiguous effect of general IPR strengthening on inequality,
we will show that tightening patent protection in basic research may increase or decrease
wage inequality. Similarly to Furukawa (2007), increasing upstream patent rights has an
inverted U-shaped effect on long-term growth, but due to restricted development rather than
reduced experience.
In our framework, basic and applied research technologies are heterogenous and the bar-
gaining power of the upstream innovation changes,2 thus stylizing the evolution of the US
jurisprudence after 1980. From that date on, the US national system of innovation has been re-
shaped by a sequence of important new laws and by a cumulative sequence of sentences that
set the precedents for future modifications in the jurisprudence. All these changes pointed
2 Our framework somewhat complements Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008), that envisages endogenous IPR
based on firm choice, instead of on jurisprudence evolution.
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to an increase in the appropriability of innovations at their initial stages.3 Being the US
legal system a common-law regime, the jurisprudence evolved gradually4 in the direction
of stricter intellectual protection of research tools,5 basic research ideas,6 etc. The essence
of the common law is that it is made by judges sitting in courts, by applying their common
sense and knowledge of legal precedent (stare decisis) to the facts before them. During the
early 1980s began a progressive process in which the U.S. Court decisions changed from the
old doctrine limiting the patentability of early-stage scientific discoveries to the conception
that also fundamental basic scientific findings (such as genetic engineering procedures or
semiconductor designs) are patentable. This process took a quarter century, culminating in
the 2002 Madey vs. Duke University Federal Circuit’s decision, which completed a process of
elimination of the “research exemption” to patent claims. Interestingly, the more recent cases
seem to be witnessing an opposite trend, most notably Merck vs. Integra Lifesciences (2005),
in which the Supreme Court decided to re-affirm research exemption in the pharmaceutical
sector.
If what deeply characterizes common law (and sharply separates it from the Continental
Europe-type legal systems) is an uninterrupted continuity such that within the stare decisis
regime an institutional break point is even hardly conceivable, we must conclude that the
analysis of the effects of the US patent policy on the economy is forced to include the whole
transition dynamics. The law and economics literature is currently modelling the evolution of
the case law in the perspective of analyzing Benjamin Cardozo’s and Richard Posner’s view
of common law as efficiency promoting. In fact, according to this influential view, unlike civil
law, being the common law decentralized, it follows the aggregate decision making of several
heterogenous judges, whose idiosyncratic opinions average one another. Moreover, the very
sequential precedent structure, implies that one appellate court overrules another’s decision,
tending to progressive mitigation and efficiency only if the majority of the judges is unbiased,
depending also on the judge’s effort cost of changing the legal rule established in a precedent
(Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007b). Appellate courts may change a previously established legal
rule also by “distinguishing” the case based on the consideration of a “previously neglected
dimension” (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007a), which can facilitate convergence towards a more
efficient legal rule. We wonder whether the increasingly pro-upstream R&D court orientation
from the early 1980s to 2002 has benefited innovation or just followed the bias of less and
less liberal judges.
In this paper, we also look for potentially detectable aspects of the time series of several
important variables—skill wage premium, education, innovation, labour force allocation,
and the market value of patents—associated with either long-term evolution of the legal
rules. In doing so, we follow a dynamic general equilibrium perspective, which allows us to
3 Including the Stevenson-Wydler act of 1980 and the Bayh–Dole act, of 1980, which amended the patent
law to facilitate the commercialization of inventions obtained thanks to government funding, especially by
universities. The pro-early innovation cultural change is also reflected in the increasing protection of trade-
secrets—starting in the 80s with the Uniform Trade Secret Act and culminating with the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996 (Cozzi 2001)—as well as in the increasingly positive attitude towards software patents (Hunt
2001; Hall 2009), culminating in the Final Computer Related Examination Guidelines issued by the USPTO
in 1996.
4 In our case, it is important to recall Janice Mueller’s (2004) account of the common law development of a
narrow experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability: with special reference to the discussion
of the change in the doctrine from 1976s Pitcairn v. United States, through 1984s Federal Circuit decision of
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., all the way to Madey v. Duke University in 2002.
5 Another important source of change in sharpening IPRs can be driven by special interests, as studied by
Chu (2008).
6 See Gallini (2002), Mueller (2001, 2004), and Scotchmer (2004).
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assume that economic agents are sufficiently intelligent to detect what “trend” is occurring,
and suitably take optimizing decisions.
In order to analyze the effects of an expected and progressive change in the patent protec-
tion of basic research, we therefore need to simulate all variables in their transitional dynam-
ics. We will extract lessons from our numerical results, useful to detect whether increasing
basic research protection common law doctrine is gradually facilitating the national system
of innovation or evolving for the worse.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set up the model for
the case of exogenous skill composition, which is useful to introduce the main aspects of our
model and to draw some preliminary predictions. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and
the steady state, and shows some representative simulations of the transition of our economy
driven by a change in the upstream researcher’s bargaining power. Section 5 extends the
model to endogenous skill acquisition, and Sect. 6 characterizes the equilibrium and the
steady state of this full model. Section 7 analyzes a special case, useful as a benchmark
and derives a potentially useful empirical “rule of thumb”. Section 8 identifies a potentially
important problem with blocking patents. In Sect. 9 we show the numerical simulations of
the transitional dynamics of the full model, and test their robustness to some extensions.
Section 10 concludes. The most challenging proofs are in Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Households
In this section, we introduce a simple version of our model, leaving the labour-force skill
composition exogenous. This will allow the reader to understand the logic of our main results
in a relatively simple way, while preparing the stage for the full model, with endogenous skill
acquisition, which will be carried out in Sect. 5. We assume an economy in which the indi-
vidual decisions are taken within the household by maximizing the following intertemporally
additive utility functional:
U =
∞∫
0
e−ρt u (t) dt, (1)
where ρ > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference and u (t) is the per-family member
instantaneous utility. In turn, u (t) is defined as:
u (t) =
1∫
0
ln
⎡
⎣∑
j
γ j d j t (ω)
⎤
⎦ dω, (2)
where d jt (ω) is the individual consumption of a good of quality j = 1, 2, . . . and produced
in industry ω ∈ [0, 1] at time t , and bought at price p jt (ω) . Parameter γ > 1 measures
the size of the quality upgrades. In each household a fraction h of the labour endowment is
skilled,7 earning wage wH , and a fraction l = 1 − h is unskilled, earning wage wL , which
we will normalize to 1. Skilled labour can work both in manufacturing and R&D, whereas
unskilled labour can only work in manufacturing.
7 We will endogenize skill acquisition in Sect. 5.
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Defining per-capita expenditure on consumption goods as e(t) = ∫ 10
[∑
j p j t
(ω) d jt (ω)
]
dω, the real interest rate as i(t), time 0 intertemporal budget constraint is∫ ∞
0 e
gt−∫ t0 i(τ )dτ e (t) dt ≤ F(0), where F(0) is the present discounted value of all future
family incomes, i.e. wages, interests, and dividends. Let percapita asset holdings at time t be
denoted by a(t).
Following standard steps of quality ladder theory,8 we can show that the consumers will
only buy goods with the lowest quality-adjusted price, and that the Euler equation applies:
e˙(t)/e(t) = i(t) − (ρ + g) = r(t) − ρ, (3)
where r(t) ≡ i(t) − g is the population growth deflated instantaneous interest rate at time t .
Equation (3), initial percapital assets, a(0), together with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞ a(t)
∞∫
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(τ )dτ = 0, (4)
determines the consumer choice of e(t).
2.2 Manufacturing
In each final good industry ω ∈ [0, 1] and for each quality level j (ω) of the good, production
is carried out according to the following Cobb–Douglas production function
Y (ω, t) = Xα (ω, t) L1−α (ω, t) , for all ω ∈ [0, 1], (5)
where α ∈ (0, 1), Y (ω, t) is the output flow at time t , X (ω, t) and L (ω, t) are the skilled
and unskilled labour inputs. In each industry firms minimize costs by choosing input ratios
X (ω, t)
L (ω, t)
= 1
wH (t)
α
1 − α . (6)
The total per-capita amount l(t) of unskilled labour only works in the manufacturing
sectors. Therefore the aggregate skilled labour demand is equal to:
X (ω, t) = 1
wH (t)
(
α
1 − α
)
l(t)N (t) (7)
In per-capita terms,
x(ω, t) ≡ X (ω, t)
N (t)
= 1
wH (t)
(
α
1 − α
)
l(t) ≡ x(t). (8)
Moreover, percapita output is:
y(ω, t) ≡ Y (ω, t)
N (t)
= 1
wH (t)α
(
α
1 − α
)α
l(t) ≡ y(t). (9)
As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), skilled labour can also work in the R&D sectors. There-
fore, a higher skill premium wH (t) frees resources for the R&D sectors.
We assume instantaneous Bertrand competition in all sectors. Due to Cobb–Douglas pref-
erences, consumers allocate the same budget to each variety, regardless of its quality. Since
8 See Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Segerstrom (1998).
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only the owner of the most recent top quality good patent can produce the top quality ver-
sion of its sector good, the equilibrium price9 will be equal to a mark-up γ > 1 over the
unit cost c(wH (t), 1). Since price is equal to p jt (ω) = γ c(wH (t), 1), in any equilibrium
per-capita demand is d jt (ω) = e(t)γ c(wH (t),1) ≡ d(t), which is symmetric. Therefore, in each
sector ω ∈ [0, 1], the temporary monopolist who owns the top quality product patent earns
the same profit (ω, t) = (t), which, in per-capita terms, is equal to10:
(t)
N (t)
≡ π(t) = γ − 1
γ
e(t) = (γ − 1)wH (t)x(t)
α
= (γ − 1) 1
1 − α l(t), (10)
where in equilibrium l(t) = l constant.
Similarly for the skilled labour market equilibrium condition
x(t) + m(A0(t))nB(t) + (1 − m(A0(t))) n A(t) = h(t), (11)
where h(t) ≡ H(t)/N (t) = h is the (constant in equilibrium) aggregate population-adjusted
human capital, m(A0(t)) denotes the mass of sectors where basic research is undertaken at
time t , and 1 − m(A0(t)) denotes mass of sectors where basic research is not undertaken.
3 R&D and Schumpeterian dynamics
The quality level j of each final product of variety ω ∈ [0, 1] can increase as a result of R&D
undertaken by private firms. In order to capture the interaction between basic and applied
research, we assume that a basic research idea is a pre-requisite to applied research and applied
R&D success opens the door for a further basic research advance. The first stage—basic
research—is the outcome of a Poisson process with probability intensity λ0N (t)
(
NB (ω,t)
N (t)
)−a
per unit of research labour, where λ0 > 0 is a basic research productivity parameter, NB(ω, t)
is the mass of research labour employed in sector ω at time t , and a > 0 is a congestion
externality parameter.
The second stage—applied research—completes the basic research idea and generates
the new higher quality good according to a Poisson process with probability intensity
λ1
N (t)
(
NA(ω,t)
N (t)
)−a
per unit of research labour, where λ1 > 0 is an applied research pro-
ductivity parameter; NA(ω, t) is the mass of research labour employed in sector ω at time t ;
and a > 0 is the congestions externality parameter. The presence of population size, N (t),
in the denominator states that R&D difficulty increases with the total population in the econ-
omy,11 which delivers endogenous growth without the strong scale effect,12 as suggested
by Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Young (1998), Peretto (1998, 1999), Dinopoulos
9 As in Grossman and Helpman (1991b, pp. 88–91).
10 The second equality builds on the Cobb–Douglas property that minimum total cost is[(
1−α
α
)−(1−α) + ( α1−α
)−α]
ws (t)αwu(t)1−α X (ω, t)α L (ω, t)1−α . Notice that profit is (γ − 1) times
total costs because unit costs are constant due to the assumed constant returns to scale (CRS) technology.
Using Eq. (8) and simplifying gives the result.
11 Population density favours innovation at the local level (see Carlino and Hunt 2001): according to this
solution to the strong scale effect, the dilution of R&D is not related to population density, but with the overall
size of the economy.
12 See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Jones (2005).
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and Thompson (1998), Howitt (1999), and recently confirmed empirically by Ha and Howitt
(2007) and Madsen (2008).
Defining nB(ω, t) ≡ NB (ω,t)N (t) and n A(ω, t) ≡ NA(ω,t)N (t) , as the skilled labor employment
in each basic and, respectively, applied R&D sector, we can express the expected innova-
tion rate in a ω′ sector undertaking only basic R&D as λ0nB(ω′, t)1−a and the expected
innovation rate in a ω′′ sector undertaking only applied R&D as λ1n A(ω′′, t)1−a . All sto-
chastic processes are independent both across sectors and across firms. Hence, the exis-
tence of a continuum of sectors implies that the law of large number applies and aggregate
variables evolve deterministically. Since all sectors switch from hosting only basic R&D
firms—belonging to subset A0(t) ⊂ [0, 1]—to hosting only applied R&D—belonging to
subset A1(t) ⊂ [0, 1]—the mass of sectors belonging to each type will flow determinis-
tically.13 Notice that A0(t) ∪ A1(t) = [0, 1] and A0(t) ∩ A1(t) = ∅. Moreover, in our
model, symmetric equilibria exist, allowing us to simplify notation: nB(ω, t) ≡ nB(t) and
n A(ω, t) ≡ n A(t). Therefore, if m(A0(t)) ∈]0, 1[ is the Lebesgue mass of the A0(t) subset—
and hence m(A1(t)) = 1 − m(A0(t)) the Lebesgue mass of A1(t) subset—its evolution will
be deterministic and described by the following first order differential equation:
dm(A0(t))
dt
= (1 − m(A0(t))) λ1 (n A(t))1−a − m(A0(t))λ0 (nB(t))1−a . (12)
We assume free entry into basic and applied research. Each inventor, be she basic or
applied, is granted a patent. However, though the first R&D firm that invents a new final
product gets the patent anyway, it will infringe the patent held by the previous basic research
inventor. Therefore it will have to bargain with the basic research patent holder in order to
produce the new version of this good. A patent gives its holder a “right to block”, but he/she
will exercise it only to the extent that it is profitable to do so: this confers him/her the ability
to obtain a share of the final good patent value, because it allows him/her to credibly threaten
to block the production of the newly discovered final good in case negotiations fail. This
“right to block” is essential because otherwise the successful applied researcher would just
walk away with the full value of the final good patent, leaving basic research unrewarded.14
Such a framework captures important aspects of the real world disputes between inventors
whose patent claims allow the blocking of inventions.15 Let β(t) ∈]0, 1[ denote the share of
the final product (applied) patent value assigned—at the end of the negotiations taking place
at time t—to the upstream (basic) patent holder.16 This share captures time t court orientation
towards intellectual property. Changes in the jurisprudence towards stronger patent claims
and weaker research exemptions would correspond to increases in β(t), whereas a gradually
looser upstream patent holder protection and stronger research exemptions would correspond
to a decliningβ(t). Taken literally,β(t) can be obtained as a Nash bargaining solution between
the patent blocker and the applied developer, with the courts orientation dictating the relative
bargaining power. Theoretically, it is important to notice that both patent holders’ outside
13 Provided the initial Lebesgue mass of each was positive.
14 For basic research in the presence of non-pecuniary rewards, see Cozzi and Galli (2009).
15 O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Chu (2009) are indirectly related, as they capture the role of
patent claims in molding the bargaining between current and future innovators: their concepts of patentability
requirement and leading breadth could be re-adapted here to accomodate the blocking power of the upstream
patent holder.
16 Assuming that basic and applied innovators match and target applied innovator-specific innovations, we
could re-read this strategic interaction as Aghion and Tirole’s (1994a, 1994b) research unit (RU) and customer
(C). Then our case would clearly correspond to when RU’s effort is important (U˜C > UC ), which implies that
“the property right is allocated to RU” (Aghion and Tirole 1994b, p. 1191). In this light, our β(t) generalizes
Aghion and Tirole’s (1994a, 1994b) equal split assumption.
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options are zero: in case bargaining breaks down the applied patent holder cannot produce
(zero profit), while the patent blocker cannot complete or find another completer because the
application is now prior art.17
In what follows, we will consider gradual changes in patent policy in terms of the sign of
β˙(t). We will assume that the following specification holds:
β˙(t) = (1 − ψ)(β¯ − β(t)). (13)
Equation (13) is a linear differential equation with constant coefficients, which describes
the speed of change in β(t) per unit time. Parameter ψ < 1 guarantees asymptotic stability
and β¯ ∈]0, 1[ is the steady state. We will consider the progressive tightening of intellectual
property rights in the US as the result of a sudden change in β¯, which determines a gradual
increase in β(t) from its previous lower steady state level to its new level.
It is important to notice that we are in a rational expectations framework: in our model, all
economic agents can predict, after the regime change, the successive increases in β(t), and
all decisions are re-optimized accordingly. Hence all our numerical simulations are immune
to Lucas’ critique. In fact, the steady upstream shift of innovation incentives is too regular not
to be incorporated in people’s expectations, which leads law scholars to view post-1980 as
a sort of structural break of Eq. (13), and forces us to study the whole transitional dynamics
of the model’s economy. The statutory decisions taken in the early 1980s triggered a gradual
change in the common law.18
Let us define vB , v0L , and v
1
L as the population-adjusted present expected value of a basic
research patent (vB ), of an A0 industry quality leader (v0L ), and of an A1 industry challenged
leader (v1L ).
Costless arbitrage between risk free activities and firms’ equities imply that in equilibrium
at each instant the following equations shall hold:
wH (t) = λ0nB(t)−avB(t) (14a)
r(t)vB(t) = λ1n A(t)1−a
(
β(t)v0L(t) − vB(t)
) + dvB(t)
dt
(14b)
wH (t) = λ1n A(t)−a (1 − β(t)) v0L(t) (14c)
r(t)v0L (t) = π(t) − λ0nB(t)1−a
(
v0L(t) − v1L(t)
) + dv0L(t)
dt
(14d)
r(t)v1L (t) = π(t) − λ1n A(t)1−av1L(t) +
dv1L(t)
dt
(14e)
The value of a monopolist in an A0 industry, v0L , has to obey Eq. (14d): in fact, the
shareholders of the current quality leader compare the risk free income, rv0L , obtainable from
selling their shares and buying risk free bonds to the expected value of their profits, π , net of
probable capital loss, λ0n1−aB
(
v0L − v1L
)
, in case a new basic research result appears in the
industry.
As soon as a new basic R&D result appears in the industry, the incumbent monopolist’s
value falls down to a lower, but still positive, value v1L , which has to obey Eq. (14e): as
before, risk free income is equated to expected profits net of expected capital loss, but now
the probability of the basic research idea’s being completed by applied research in the industry,
17 In the more realistic case that basic research results have multiple applications, this would increase the
blocker’s outside option and its equilibrium share of the final patent value.
18 According to Fon and Parisi (2006), such a case evolution could also appear in a civil law system.
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λ1n
1−a
A , is the monopolistic profit hazard rate, as the arrival of the new final product implies
the complete displacement of the current leading edge product.
Equation (14a) characterizes free entry into basic R&D (in an A0 industry), equalizing the
skilled wage to the probability λ0n−aB of inventing times the value vB of the resulting patent.
Equation (14b) equates the risk free income from selling a basic R&D patent, rvB , to
the expected earnings from holding it in an A1 industry—given by the expected capital gain,
v0L −vB , generated by the n A downstream researchers’ discovering the industrial application,
plus the gradual appreciation in the case of applied R&D not succeeding, dvBdt .
Equation (14c) is the free entry condition for applied researchers who rationally expect to
appropriate only fraction 1 − β of the value of the final good monopolist.
It is interesting to remark that we are not restricting the basic research patent holder from
undertaking applied R&D on its own research tool and developing its final good patent “in-
house”. We are just allowing other applied researchers to develop that idea equally well. In
fact, were the basic patent holder hiring nb > 0 units of human capital,19 we would rewrite
Eq. (14b) as:
r(t)vB(t) = λ1n A(t)1−a
(
β(t)v0L(t) − vB(t)
) − nbwH (t)
+nbλ1n A(t)−a (1 − β(t)) v0L(t) +
dvB(t)
dt
= λ1n A(t)1−a
(
β(t)v0L(t) − vB(t)
) + dvB(t)
dt
,
where the second equality follows from Eq. (14c). Hence our Eq. (14b) entails no loss
of generality, and it is consistent with private basic research done within large companies
which utilize their innovations themselves: all we need for our equations to be valid and
for the aggregate predictions we obtain is to assume free entry into both basic and applied
research.20
It is useful to remark that free entry into both basic and applied research guarantees zero
average profits. For this reason, our model is not only suitable for the analysis of private
R&D, but also for characterizing basic research undertaken by institutions (universities and
non-profit institutions, federal laboratories, foundations) which do not look for profits, but
may be constrained to break even.
4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, households choose consumption to maximize utility taking prices as given,
manufacturing firms compete in each industry choosing their prices; basic research firms,
applied research firms, and basic research patent holders maximize their profits taking prices
as given; all markets clear; all arbitrage opportunities have been exploited; the stock variable,
m(A0(t)), evolves according to its law of motion. More specifically, we focus on a symmetric
equilibrium, which implies that all industry variables are equal: it consists in a time path of
quantities β(t), x(t), y(t), nB(t), n A(t), and m(A0(t)), a time path of prices r(t), vB(t),
19 Notice that nb does not affect the aggregate innovation rate n A in the industry, which is determined by
the free-entry condition (14c). Moreover nb > n A would not be individually rational, generating negative
expected profits. Hence in equilibrium the basic research patent holder will invest up to nb ≤ n A and free
entrant applied researchers will invest the remaining n A − nb .
20 See Cozzi (2007) for further discussion on the role of free entry into applied research.
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v0L(t), v
1
L(t), wH (t), π(t), such that at each instant of time t ≥ 0, Eqs. (3), (4), (8), (11), (9),
(12), (13), (14a), (14b), (14c), (14d), and (14e) are satisfied.
In a steady state, the time derivatives of the percapita variables of the above-mentioned
equations are constant, and we can state:
Definition A steady state equilibrium is a vector
[
β, x, y, nB , n A, m(A0), r, vB , v0L , v
1
L ,
wH , π] ∈ R12++ which satisfies the following equations:
β = β¯ (15)
r = ρ (16)
x = 1
wH
(
α
1 − α
)
l (17)
y = 1
wαH
(
α
1 − α
)α
l (18)
π = (γ − 1) 1
1 − α l (19)
x + m(A0)nB + (1 − m(A0)) n A = h (20)
(1 − m(A0)) λ1 (n A)1−a = m(A0)λ0 (nB)1−a (21)
wH = λ0n−aB vB (22a)
rvB = λ1n1−aA
(
βv0L − vB
) (22b)
wH = λ1n−aA (1 − β) v0L (22c)
rv0L = π − λ0n1−aB
(
v0L − v1L
) (22d)
rv1L = π − λ1n1−aA v1L . (22e)
In the steady state, the aggregate innovation rate is given by the total number of applied
R&D blueprints created per unit time, because it is not until the applied research suc-
ceeds that welfare increases. The aggregate probability of applied R&D success is given
by (1 − m(A0)) λ1 (n A)1−a . Notice that in a steady state this is also equal to the total number
of basic research results created per unit time, i.e. m(A0)λ0 (nB)1−a , as shown in Eq. (21).
It is easily proved that the number of quality jumps per unit time is proportional (by factor
log λ) to the growth rate of the representative agent’s instantaneous utility.
4.1 Dynamic effects of upstream patents
In this section we will illustrate the main effects of an increase in the bargaining power of
the upstream innovator, i.e. of the basic researchers, on innovation and on the skill premium,
which follow from our model’s dynamics. We have undertaken several numerical simulations
and detected common patterns. We provide here two numerical simulations highly represen-
tative of the several simulations we have undertaken. Figure 1 shows the effects of a gradual
change of β from 0.35 to 0.50, fully expected by the individuals, leading from an initial
steady state characterized by β¯ = 0.35 to a final steady state associated with β¯ = 0.50.
As the reader can see, the increase in β leads to an increase in the value of the basic
research patent, because it gives it more rights on the final good patent. This incentivizes
basic research, both at the aggregate (third plot) and at the industry (eighth plot) level.
Symmetrically, the increase in β disincentivizes applied R&D, both at the aggregate (fourth
plot) and at the industry level (ninth plot). Notice how applied R&D seems to recover a bit
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Fig. 1 Growth enhancing transition
after a while: this is a consequence of the increase in the number of research tools made
available following the increase in basic research. In fact, we can see (in the seventh plot of
the figure) that m(A0) is declining, as a consequence of more basic research and less applied
R&D per-sector. This implies that 1 − m(A0) increases: more avenues open up for applied
R&D itself. This overshooting dynamics of applied R&D over time is a very robust finding
of our simulations, as is that of basic research (third panel): the gradual decline in m(A0)
partially compensates the increase in basic research, now squeezed in a smaller number of
sectors.
The decrease in v0L and the increase in v
1
L reflect the increase in the (partial) obsolescence
of the monopolist in A0 and the decrease in the obsolescence of the monopolist in A1.
Important, and very robust as well, are the trajectories depicted in the 10th, 11th, and 12th
plots: the increase in basic R&D outweighs the decrease in applied R&D, which implies an
increase in skilled labour demand for R&D purposes; this raises the skill premium, which
liberate human capital from manufacturing. Declining skilled employment in manufacturing
in turn reduces manufacturing production. The consequence on the aggregate innovation rate
is positive, due to a better realignment of basic and applied research along with an increase
in the mass of skilled labour allocated to innovation.
Finally, all this is reflected by the last plot, which presents a pattern which we have found in
all simulations we have carried out: as a consequence of higher values of β the initial response
of the aggregate innovation rate is negative. The reason is that the stock of research tools
available moves gradually, being m(A1) a predetermined variable of our model. Therefore, as
the applied R&D per-sector, n A, declines the available research tools line will be completed
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Fig. 2 Growth harming transition
more slowly, with resulting drop in the aggregate final good patenting activity. As the more
intense flow of new research tools cumulates over time, the stock of research tools will
facilitate applied R&D and eventually raise the aggregate innovation rate.
While in Fig. 1 parameters were such that the increase in β was eventually beneficial for
aggregate innovation, we report in Fig. 2 what happens when the increase in β is detrimental
to growth, that is when the basic research patent holder has too high a bargaining power. In
Fig. 2 we show the effects of a gradual change of β from 0.55 to 0.65:
In both figures the dynamics of basic and applied R&D, both at the sectoral and at the
aggregate level, are similar, as is the dynamics of the monopolists and of the basic patent
holder. However, what differs this time is that the increase in β is too high, discouraging
applied R&D more than it encourages basic R&D, and leading to a too imbalanced allocation
of human capital. As a result, the initially high level of m(A0) attracts a lot of basic R&D—that
is nBm(A0) rises—sufficient to increase the demand for human capital in R&D, to increase
the skill premium, and to decrease manufacturing production, as in Fig. 1. However, as soon
as the flow out of A0 cumulates, the increase in m(A1) = 1−m(A0) induces a massive lay off
of basic researchers, with consequence drop in the demand for human capital and in the skill
premium, with consequence increase in the manufacturing employment and output. As for
aggregate innovation, in this case the many research tools available are developed by a more
scanty applied R&D, with insufficient completion rates and, therefore, smaller aggregate flow
of better final products. Interestingly—and robustly—the aggregate innovation rate first fall
and then partially recovers, reminiscent of Fig. 1, but not enough to compensate the initial
drop.
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In both figures, the increase or decrease in the skill premium does not affect the overall
stock of human capital, while instead it would be more realistic to assume that schooling
(college in particular) decisions are responsive to the skill premium. In the next sections,
we will in fact extend our model to the endogenous acquisition of skill through education.
However, the results obtained to far will prove quite robust also in the richer framework.
5 Endogenous skill acquisition
In this section, we extend the model of the previous section to allow for the skill premium to
incentivize education and the acquisition of skill. This renders human capital and unskilled
labour endogenous. Importantly, such an extension allows us to study the consequences
of research policy and jurisprudence evolution on schooling decisions and human capital
formation.
Let us assume, as before, a large number of dynastic families—normalized to 1 at date
t = 0. However, we will assume that the household members are born at birth rate b and
pass away at rate δ, living a period of duration D. The resulting population growth rate21 is
g = b − δ > 0. This demographic structure implies the following restrictions: b = gegD
egD−1
and δ = g
egD−1 . At time t the total number of individuals is N (t) = egt . Each individual can
spend her life working as unskilled or studying the first Tr < D periods and then working
as skilled. Each individual cares only about the utility of the average family member. Hence,
despite bounded individual life, the individual decisions are taken within the household
by maximizing the same intertemporally additive utility functional as in the the previous
economy (with exogenous skill composition):
U =
∞∫
0
e−ρt u (t) dt, (23)
where ρ > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference, and u (t) obeys Eq. (2). Following the
same steps as before, also the Euler equation (3) and the transversality condition (4 ) continue
to hold.
Individuals differ in their learning ability θ , which, for each generation, is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval. Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), we assume
that there is a minimum level of ability  ∈ [0, 1) below which individuals obtain non-
positive human capital from schooling. More specifically, an individual of ability θ ∈ [0, 1]
will be able to acquire θ −  units of human capital after an indivisible training period of
length Tr . This guarantees that a fraction of the population larger than  will never choose
to get skilled. The only cost of education is the individual’s time, which prevents her from
earning the unskilled wage wu . In what follows we choose unskilled labour as our numeraire,
and therefore set wu(t) = 1 at all t ≥ 0.
Hence an individual born at t , with (known) ability θ(t) ∈ [0, 1] and who decides to
educate herself will earn nothing from t to t + Tr , and then earn a skilled wage flow (θ(t) −
)wH (s) at all dates s ∈ [t + Tr , t + D], which implies that at time t there will exist an
ability threshold θ0(t) ∈ [, 1] below which the individual decides to work as an unskilled.
21 Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) have first developed the overlapping generations education framework
followed here. Boucekkine et al. (2002, 2007) recently studied population and human capital dynamics in
continuous time and off steady states and numerically calibrated in a way methodologically more similar to
ours.
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Threshold θ0(t) solves the following equation:
t+D∫
t
e−
∫ s
t i(τ )dτ ds = (θ0(t) − )
t+D∫
t+T r
e−
∫ s
t i(τ )dτwH (s)ds,
obtaining
θ0(t) =  +
∫ t+D
t e
− ∫ st i(τ )dτ ds∫ t+D
t+T r e
− ∫ st i(τ )dτwH (s)ds
. (24)
Since in a steady state i(t) = ρ + g, the steady state level of θ0(t) is
θ0 =  + 1 − e
−(ρ+g)D[
e−(ρ+g)T r − e−(ρ+g)D]wH , (25)
where wH denotes the steady state skill premium.
The evolution of the mass of unskilled labour per-capita responds negatively to expected
education incentives. In fact, we prove in Unskilled labor supply section in Appendix that
l˙(t) = bθ0(t) − be−gDθ0(t − D) − gl(t). (26)
Notice that this is a delayed differential equation, which needs a continuum of initial condi-
tions, back to a period of length D.
The percapita stock of human capital, h(t) ≡ H(t)/N (t), evolves according to the evo-
lution of θ0(t), obeying Eq. (24). As a consequence, in Human capital section in Appendix,
we prove that
.
h(t) = −gh(t) + b
2
e−gT r (1 − θ0(t − T r)) (1 + θ0(t − T r) − 2)
+b
2
e−gD(1 − θ0(t − D)) (1 + θ0(t − D) − 2) , (27)
which is a delayed differential equation, requiring a continuum of initial conditions in the
interval [−D, 0].
6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, households choose consumption and education to maximize utility taking
prices as given, manufacturing firms compete in each industry choosing their prices; basic
research firms, applied research firms, and basic research patent holders maximize their profits
taking prices as given; all markets clear; all arbitrage opportunities have been exploited; the
stock variables evolve according to their law of motion. More specifically, we focus on a
symmetric equilibrium, which implies that all industry variables are equal: it consists in a
time path of quantities β(t), h(t), l(t), x(t), y(t), nB(t), n A(t), and m(A0(t)), a time path of
prices r(t), vB(t), v0L(t), v
1
L(t), wH (t), π(t), and a time path of education ability threshold
level θ0(t), for all t ≥ 0, consistent with the initial conditions β(0), m(A0(0)), h(s)s∈[−D,0],
l(s)s∈[−D,0], such that at each instant of time t ≥ 0, Eqs. (3), (4), (24), (8), (26), (11), (9),
(27), (12), (13), (14a), (14b), (14c), (14d), and (14e) are satisfied.
In a steady state the time derivatives of the percapita variables of the above-mentioned
equations are constant, and we can state:
123
J Econ Growth (2014) 19:183–219 197
Definition A steady state equilibrium is a vector
[
β, h, l, x, y, nB , n A, m(A0), r, vB , v0L ,
v1L , wH , π, θ0
] ∈ R15++ which satisfies the following equations:
β = β¯ (28)
r = ρ (29)
θ0 =  + 1 − e
−(ρ+g)D[
e−(ρ+g)T r − e−(ρ+g)D]wH (30)
l = θ0 (31)
x = 1
wH
(
α
1 − α
)
l (32)
y = 1
wαH
(
α
1 − α
)α
l (33)
π = (γ − 1) 1
1 − α l (34)
h = b
[
eg(−T r) − eg(−D)] (1 − θ0) (1 + θ0 − 2)
2g
(35)
x + m(A0)nB + (1 − m(A0)) n A = h (36)
(1 − m(A0)) λ1 (n A)1−a = m(A0)λ0 (nB)1−a (37)
wH = λ0n−aB vB (38a)
rvB = λ1n1−aA
(
βv0L − vB
) (38b)
wH = λ1n−aA (1 − β) v0L (38c)
rv0L = π − λ0n1−aB
(
v0L − v1L
) (38d)
rv1L = π − λ1n1−aA v1L . (38e)
For the interpretation of Eqs. (36)–(38e), the reader is referred to the analysis of the case
without endogenous skill acquisition.
6.1 Steady state properties
The steady state equations are highly non-linear, and an analytical closed-form solution
is unattainable. We have resorted to numerical simulations of the model and have found
regularities across steady states. In particular, strengthening the steady state patent protection
of basic research, as parameterized by an increase in β¯ from 0 to 1 leads to: an inverted U-
shaped relationship in basic research, both per-industry—i.e. nB—and in the aggregate—i.e.
nBm(A0); and a decrease in industry applied R&D n A. This is clearly visible in Fig. 3, which
reports a representative case:
In the figure, we also report the effects of β¯ on m(A0). The parameters chosen for this
simulation are in line with the literature. In particular, we have set the intra-sectorial con-
gestion parameter a = 0.3, consistently with Jones and Williams’ (1998, 2000) calibrations;
the mark-up γ = 1.68, consistently with what estimated by Roeger (1995) and Martins and
Scarpetta (1996). Parameter α = 0.1—the share of high skilled workers22 in manufacturing
production, is consistent with Berman et al. (1994). Parameters D = 40, n = 0.01, Tr = 4 ,
22 We here restrict to the share of technician workers in manufacturing in the late 80s, as indicated by Berman
et al. (1994). We are ignoring other white collars, though our simulations are quite robust to alternative
specifications.
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Fig. 3 Long-term comparative statics
 = 0.75 follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999). For the real rate of return on consumer
assets, we adopt the usual ρ = 0.05, common in the literature. We set benchmark values of our
new parameter at λ0 = λ1 = 1, ϕ = 0.01, but results are robust to huge variations of them.
The reason for the observed patterns is the following: when β¯ is low basic research is
less rewarded, while applied research is highly incentivized. Hence basic research is low and
applied research is high. As β¯ increases, the share of the final value of the patent accruing to
applied research declines, which explains the drop in n A. Quite interestingly, this drop is not
specific of the current example, but holds more generally; in fact, we can prove the following:
Lemma 1 The steady state equilibrium level of applied research per-industry, n A, always
decreases in β¯.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Notice that n A is the amount of applied R&D in a sector in which applied R&D is carried
out, that is where a research tools exists: there are m(A1) = 1 − m(A0) such sectors, and
this mass is endogenous. As β¯ gets close to zero, basic research nearly disappears, but n A
keeps increasing.
Conversely, the reward to basic research increases only as long as applied research is not
too low: as is clear from Eq. (38b), vB increases in β¯ and in n A. If β¯ gets too close to 1, n A
drops towards 0, along with vB . This complementarity between applied research and basic
research is responsible for the observed non-monotonic relationship. Hence, while n A is
conditional on a research tool’s already existing, and therefore independent of nB , nB needs
to rely on the future n A in order to have chances of completion.
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Fig. 4 Growth-maximizing βs
As a consequence, m(A0) is high at low levels of β¯ and it is low at high levels of β¯.
However, when β¯ is very close to 1, the drop in applied research can make m(A0) higher again.
Aggregate applied research, i.e. n A(1−m(A0)), inherits the combination of the comparative
statics properties of n A and 1 − m(A0) .
For these reasons, strengthening patent protection of basic research, that is an increase
in β¯, increases the long-run aggregate innovation rate when the initial level of β¯ is low.
Conversely, an increase in β¯ decreases the long-run innovation rate when the initial level of
β¯ is high. Hence an interior level of β¯ maximizes the aggregate innovation rate—equal to
0.5490 in the example of Fig. 3.
The growth-maximizing level of β¯, denoted β¯∗, depends on all the parameters in the
model. Quite important are the basic and applied R&D productivity parameters, λ0 and λ1:
their effect on β¯∗ is plotted in Fig. 4.
As the reader can see, β¯∗ increases with λ1 and decreases with λ0: the more difficult basic
research relative to applied research, the higher its share of the final patent value should be.
We can characterize the system for a special case, with its camparative statics properties
locally carrying out by continuity, as shown in the next section.
7 Analysis of a benchmark special case
The analytical results of this section are obtained under the assumption that ρ = 0; since all
steady state equations are continuous in all variables and parameters, its comparative statics
results continue to hold in a positive neighborhood where ρ > 0. Consequently, in the steady
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state the real interest rate is i = r + g, and our assumption implies i = g > 0. It is useful to
notice that, strictly speaking, the transversality condition (4) continues to hold in this case.
While the utility functional ( 1) does not converge as ρ → 0, it obviously does hold in a
continuum of economies23 associated with ρ > 0.
Equation (14b), the steady state definition and r = 0 imply:
vB = βv0L . (39)
From this and from Eqs. (14a) and (14c):
n A =
(
λ1
λ0
1 − β
β
) 1
a
nB . (40)
From Eqs. (14d) and (14e), the steady state definition and r = 0, and Eq. (40), we can
write:
v0L =
[(
λ1
λ0
) 1
a
(
1 − β
β
) 1−a
a + 1
]
v1L . (41)
Imposing the steady state into (12) and using (40) yields:
Lemma 2 If ρ = 0, the steady state equilibrium fraction of industries where basic R&D is
active is
m(A0) = 1
1 +
(
λ0
λ1
) 1
a
(
β
1−β
) 1−a
a
. (42)
Lemma 2 indicates that the higher the difficulty of basic research (applied research), i.e.
the lower λ0 (the lower λ1) the higher the fraction of sectors where basic (applied) R&D is
needed.
This has implications for the innovation-enhancing regulation:
Proposition 1 If ρ = 0, the growth maximizing upstream inventor share, β∗, of the final
good patent value is equal to:
β∗ = λ1
λ0 + λ1 =
1
λ0
λ1
+ 1 . (43)
Proof See Appendix unionsq
Proposition 1 states that the innovators should be rewarded proportionally more in the stages
of R&D where innovation is harder to achieve. Plugging β∗ into Eq. (40) implies that at
the growth-maximizing policy n A = nB . Hence the innovation-maximizing share is higher
in the industry where (equilibrium) innovation is slower—expected times 1
λ0n
1−a
B
> 1
λ1n
1−a
A
imply β∗ > 0.5 and vice-versa. This is in line with our more general numerical results, as
shown, for example, in Fig. 3. Interestingly, setting β = β∗ in Eq. (42) gives m(A0) = β∗.
Setting β = m(A0) in Eq. (42) delivers a unique solution in [0, 1]: exactly β = β∗.
It is important to notice that here β∗ is common across industries without the risk of a
“one-size-fits-all” loss (Chu 2010b) only because all industries are symmetric. However, with
heterogenous industries, it would be interesting to generalize this result.
23 We have also checked that the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables change continuously by
undertaking numerical simulations.
123
J Econ Growth (2014) 19:183–219 201
7.1 Hosios condition interpretation
We can draw a similarity between the optimal basic researcher’s sharing rule expressed by Eq.
(43) and Hosios (1990) constrained efficiency condition in Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
search and matching models. Of course, here we do not have unemployed searching for jobs
and vacancies waiting for unemployed, but basic researchers searching for research tools
upon which applied researchers search for completions. However, as in search and matching
models, both research activities exert a positive externality on the other type of activity and
a negative externality (due to congestion) on itself, and in a steady state equilibrium n A and
nB do not change over time.24 Therefore we could reinterprete the discovery of a new final
good as a successful “match” between a basic research unit of human capital and an applied
research unit of human capital.
Under this interpretation, the number of successful matches between a basic research unit
(of human capital) and an applied research unit is given by the aggregate innovation rate,
which, using Eq. (37), in the steady state is equal to
g = λ0n
1−a
B λ1n
1−a
A
λ0n
1−a
B + λ1n1−aA
. (44)
which shows that our “matching function” has decreasing returns to scale due to intra-
industry research congestions. While this precludes the application of original Hosios (1990)
rule, which requires CRS, we can use Ellison et al. (2013) result, which shows how Hosios’
conditions must be generalised to non-constant returns to scale.
To achieve that, notice that the right hand side of Eq. (44) is a monotone transformation,
namely (·) = λ0λ1
λ0+λ1 (·)1−a , of the following CRS aggregate search activity function25
M(nB , n A) =
[
λ0 + λ1
λ0λ1
(
λ0n
1−a
B λ1n
1−a
A
λ0n
1−a
B + λ1n1−aA
)] 1
1−a
.
Hence our matching function (M(nB , n A)) is homothetic and has decreasing returns to
scale.
Applying to Ellison et al.’s (2013) Corollary 1 to our framework, the generalized Hosios’
condition dictates an optimal share of basic research βHosiosB and of applied research β
Hosios
A
which satisfy:
βHosiosB = ηM/nB η(g) = ηM/nB (1 − a) (45)
βHosiosA = ηM/n Aη(g) = ηM/n A (1 − a) , (46)
where η(M) = M′(M)
(M) = 1 − a is the elasticity of the matching function, g, with respect to
aggregate search activity, M ; and the elasticities with respect to basic and applied research
are denoted26 ηM/nB and ηM/n A . In turn, the elasticity of function M with respect to nB ,
ηM/nB , is equal to:
24 Hence it does no harm to abstract from R&D sequentiality and imagine both activities to be taken simulta-
neously. This is also facilitated by the zero-interest rate assumption of this simpler model—which (along with
the steady state) was indeed assumed by Hosios (1990) original paper.
25 We adopt Ellison et al. (2013) definition of the CRS function M (which they denote m) as “aggregate
search activity”, converted to matches by transformation . Notice that our set up satisfies M(1, 1) = 1 and
(0) = 0, as required by Ellison et al. (2013).
26 They correspond to α and 1 − α of Ellison et al. (2013).
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ηM/nB =
λ1
λ0
(
nB
n A
)1−a + λ1
, (47)
while the elasticity with respect to n A, ηM/n A , is equal to:
ηM/n A =
λ0
λ0 + λ1
(
nB
n A
)a−1 . (48)
Clearly ηM/nB and ηM/n A sum to 1 due to the constant returns of function M .
It is easy to re-obtain the equivalent of Eq. (40) with the shares of basic, respectively
applied, R&D denoted βHosiosB , respectively β
Hosios
A , instead of β and 1 − β:
nB
n A
=
(
λ0
λ1
βHosiosB
βHosiosA
) 1
a
, (49)
where we are now not assuming βHosiosB + βHosiosA = 1 for reasons that will become clear
shortly.
Plugging (49) into Eqs. (47) and (48), and plugging them back in Eqs. (45) and (46), gives
the locally optimal shares according to the generalized Hosios conditions:
βHosiosB = (1 − a)
λ1
λ0 + λ1 = (1 − a)β
∗, and
βHosiosA = (1 − a)
λ0
λ0 + λ1 = (1 − a)
(
1 − β∗) . (50)
Equations (45) and (46)27 imply that the generalized Hosios conditions—which requires
that in a locally efficient decentralized matching the surplus shares are proportional to the
elasticities of matching—provides a similar result as our growth-maximizing sharing rule
β∗ found in the previous section. However, there is a correction, due to the additional neg-
ative externality of R&D “market size” underlying the decreasing returns of our “matching
function” (44). In such a case, the optimal surplus shares do not sum to one because under
“decreasing returns to scale, the surplus must be taxed in order to give agents appropri-
ate search incentives.” (Ellison et al. 2013). Quite interestingly, the mere application of the
original Hosios (1990) rule, avoiding to rescale researchers’ shares by 1 − a, would deliver
exactly our previous growth maximizing β∗. Hence while the Hosios rule, literally taken,
would align incentives to correct relative market tightness, the rescaling provided by Eq. (50)
also corrects for the absolute size externality.
7.2 An empirical “rule of thumb”
The special case we have just analyzed allows us to gain some insight on aggregate empirical
evidence. In particular, from the knowledge of the basic to applied research ratio, B AR, we
can easily obtain approximations for the actual values of β. In fact, Eqs. (40) and (42) yield:
27 Ellison et al.’s (2013) Corollary 1 also requires an additional technical condition (Eq. 27), which in our
framework becomes a1−a <
λ1
λ0
. It will be valid as long as the congestion parameter is not too high and the
productivity parameter of applied R&D is not too low relative to that of the basic research.
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Table 1 Data for Eq. (Beta)
Data on US Basic Research, US
Applied Research, and US “Beta”
(upstream bargaining power)
Source National Science
Foundation (2013, Table 3 and 4)
and our calculations based on Eq.
(Beta)
Year Basic R&D Applied R&D Beta
1981 18,492 31,267 0.371631
1982 19,221 32,877 0.368939
1983 20,624 35,238 0.369196
1984 22,306 37,564 0.372574
1985 23,951 41,251 0.367335
1986 27,255 43,280 0.386404
1987 28,536 43,158 0.398025
1988 29,538 44,079 0.401239
1989 31,489 46,430 0.404125
1990 31,896 48,333 0.397562
1991 36,302 51,674 0.412635
1992 36,068 49,568 0.421178
1993 36,744 47,661 0.43533
1994 37,123 45,845 0.447438
1995 36,315 50,206 0.419725
1996 39,475 51,957 0.431742
1997 43,664 55,058 0.442292
1998 41,366 54,218 0.432771
1999 44,872 59,938 0.428127
2000 48,186 63,885 0.42996
2001 52,605 70,735 0.426504
2002 56,295 55,096 0.505382
2003 59,584 65,203 0.477486
2004 59,648 71,775 0.453863
2005 61,321 70,001 0.466951
2006 60,065 74,333 0.446919
2007 61,776 78,661 0.439883
2008 63,487 68,905 0.479537
2009 65,197 66,419 0.495359
2010 66,908 71,666 0.482833
2011 68,619 71,220 0.4907
B AR = nBm(A0)
n A [1 − m(A0)] =
(
λ1
λ0
1 − β
β
)−1
a
(
λ0
λ1
)−1
a
(
β
1 − β
)− 1−aa
= β
1 − β ,
which implies
β = B AR
1 + B AR . (Beta)
Given its extremely simple formulation, we can easily provide some of its values in the
reported Table 1.
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Fig. 5 Applied R&D/basic R&D in the US. Data from National Science Foundation (2013)
Therefore, according to the data28 of Table 1, in 1981 our calibrated β would be equal to
37.16 %, while in 2002 it would have climbed up to its highest ever level of 50.53 %, taken on
by β right in the year of the Madey vs. Duke University Federal Circuit’s decision. After that,
it has declined below 50 %, including becoming 46.69 % in the year of the Merck vs. Integra
Lifesciences (2005) ruling.29 Of course, these calibrated values are to be taken as a “rule
of thumb” indicator of the bargaining power of the upstream innovator: off-steady state and
with changing interest rates they ought to be adjusted. Equation (Beta)’s shortcut may offer
a microfounded and yet easy-to-compute approximation to practitioners and policy-makers
only to stimulate further investigation.
A stricking consequence can be viewed in the NSF data on basic and applied research,
which suggest that, while both types of R&D have increased over time (due to population
growth, market size growth, surge in higher education, etc.), applied research relative to basic
research has steadily and considerably declined in that period, as shown in Fig. 5 passing
from 1.69 in 1981 to 0.99 in 2002, year of its lowest peak ever: a massive reduction of more
than one third, with basic research overtaking applied research for the first time at least since
1953.
In the model so far we have been deriving results under the working assumption that the
whole basic research is done by profit-maximizing firms. However, as Gersbach et al. (2010,
2012) and Akcigit et al. (2012) document, a large part of basic research is carried out by
public institutions: according to the NSF, in 2011, total basic research investment in the US
was $69,218 (2005 constant dollars).30 Only about 20 % of this ($14,611 milions) is done
by the profit seeking business sector. Can our theory, and our empirical rule of thumb, be
reconciled with this important stylized fact? It easily can, as long as also the private sector
undertakes some basic research31 and entry into the R&D activity is unrestricted. In fact,
28 Based on National Science Foundation (2013), Table 3 (“U.S. applied research expenditures”, “All
Sources”) and Table 4 (“U.S. applied research expenditures”, “All Sources”), in million constant 2005 dollars:
1953–2011.
29 Which reopened the door to the research exemption doctrine at least for the pharmaceutical sector.
30 http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf13318/.
31 That is, if publicly-funded basic research is not so huge to completely crowd the private R&D out of the
market, so that Eq. (14a) is still valid.
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assuming that a fraction of basic research per-sector is performed publicly would imply that
our steady state equations would incorporate one additional equation:
nB = ngovB + n privB ,
where ngovB is the (per-capita amount of) publicly funded basic R&D labour per-sector
and n privB is the privately funded basic R&D labour per-sector. Notice that n
gov
B would be
exogenous,32 while n privB would be the new endogenous variable. In any equilibrium with
n
priv
B > 0—which is quite realistic—all the other equilibrium equations would still hold,33
with no change in the aggregate results.
8 Strictly blocking patents
The present setup with basic and applied R&D is suitable to analyze a crucial issue: the
patenting of basic research may hinder applied innovations because even basic concepts are
patented which potentially precludes new innovations. Clearly, the incumbent monopolist in
the corresponding final good sector is the natural suspect of such anti-innovative behavior.
In fact, by appropriating the patent on a basic research result and stopping R&D it would
eliminate expected obsolescence on its product, causing its value to jump up to π
r
, because
profits34 last forever. In the steady state, the incumbent monopolist will buy the patent in
order to block innovation in that sector if its willingness to pay for the research tool is higher
than the outsiders’ reservation price, that is if and only if:
vB ≤ π
r
− v1L . (51)
Equation (51) is equivalent to rv1L − π ≤ −rvB . This and Eq. (14e) imply that
−λ1n A1−av1L ≤ −rvB .
Using Eq. (14b), the above inequality becomes equivalent to:
vB + v1L ≥ βv0L . (52)
Quite interestingly, for the benchmark special case of the previous section, due to Eq. (39),
the inequality (52) is certainly satisfied with strict inequality. While the benchmark special
case is only valid as a mathematical approximation of the steady state equilibrium equations,
by continuity the following holds:
32 Alternatively, we could assume that a given level of public expenditure G is planned, with its actual amount
per-sector ngovB = Gm(A0)wH being determined endogenously. As long as n
gov
B does not exceed the level of
nB which satisfies free entry condition (14a), our equilibrium will be unchanged.
33 Of course, in so doing we are assuming that the government funded R&D is equally productive and that
government agencies wish to derive the deserved income share β of the value of the private profits generated
by their innovations. This is certainly possible after 1980 Bayh-Dole and Stevenson–Wydler acts. Moreover,
the Reagan administration strongly encouraged the patentability of research outcomes obtained by the use of
public funds as a vehicle to find new sources of government revenues alternative to taxation. Our zero-profit
conditions clearly allow this public R&D to self-finance itself.
34 The profit of the blocking monopolist is always the same, π , regardless of the progressively lower relative
quality of its good. This is a consequence of our assumed Cobb–Douglas preference structure, characterized
by unit elasticity of substitution across varieties. If the elasticity of substitution was higher (lower) than 1 the
profits would gradually decline (increase). A more complete model, beyond the scope of this paper, would
also consider a realistic finite patent life.
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Lemma 3 In an open right neighborhood of ρ = 0, the steady state equilibrium implies an
attempt of incumbents to block innovation.
This points to a serious problem in the patenting of basic (or applied) research: a danger,
which may become true if the courts are not ready to detect such a practice.35 In a well
functioning judicial system, according to Maurer and Scotchmer (2004, p. 90), courts “usu-
ally approve arrangements that remove blocking patents so that firms can bring technologies
to market.” The typical arrangement is the compulsory licensing of the patented innovative
tool. In a recent paper, Galasso and Schankerman (2013) find robust evidence of the blocking
effect of patents held by large firms (the “incumbents” of our paper) to downstream innovation
undertaken by small firms (the freely entrant applied R&D firms of our model): when some
of these patents are invalidated by the courts, follow on innovation will significantly increase.
They also find that this problem afflicts the medical instruments and biotechnology, electron-
ics, and computers sectors. Given the incentives to block of potentially powerful incumbent
patent holders highlighted in this section, we conclude that in the presence of patentable
basic research results the courts play a crucial role in protecting innovative activity.
9 Insights from transitional simulations
In this section we will focus on the transitional dynamics of our model. In particular, we
will show that when the bargaining power of the basic researcher, i.e. β, increases, it always
looks bad at first. Even if it is good for long-run growth, in the short- or even medium-run it
presents itself as harmful to growth. In order to show the mechanism at work, we report two
representative trajectories obtained for the endogenous variables following the announcement
of a regime change in the law of motion of β. This corresponds to a sudden change in the
steady state value of β¯, which gradually drives, via Eq. (13), the system towards the new
steady state. We ran several discrete approximations of the differential equations (12), (16),
(14b), (14d), (14e), (53), (54), (55), (56), and cross-equations restrictions (8), (10), (11),
(14a), (14c), (70), and (59), obtaining remarkably robust results.36 We will keep the same
parameters as used in Fig. 3. As for the common law adjustment parameter, we have set
ψ = 0.9.
We assume that the economy begins with a steady state associated with a given value of
β¯. Then β¯ changes and the common law share of the basic research inventor starts to head
towards its new steady state value.
In order to make different simulations comparable, we plot the trajectories of the devi-
ations of the value of each variable from its initial steady state value, divided by its ini-
tial steady state value. For example, the “aggregate innovation rate” of the last subplot
is the normalized deviation of the number of applied innovations per unit time, that is of
(1 − m(A0(t))) λ1 (n A(t))1−a , from its initial steady state value.
Figure 6 assumes that, after a long term (40 periods) initial value of β¯ = 0.35, it suddenly
changes to β¯ = 0.5. We conjecture that such a change will be beneficial for long-term
growth. In fact, we know from Proposition 1, that β¯ = 0.5 would maximize growth for
35 This is an old problem in the history of patents. As reported by Scotchmer (2004, p. 14), “James Watt
(d. 1819) used his patents to block high-pressure improvements…Watt’s refusal to license competitors froze
steam-engine technology for two decades.” Fortunately, patent legal life was not as long as assumed in our
model.
36 We have also simulated how the dynamic behavior changes if β immediately jumps to the new steady state
level, either expected or unexpected. The basic message of this section is robust to these variants.
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Fig. 6 Growth enhancing transition
perfectly patient agents. Since here ρ > 0, we expect that impatient agents require basic
research to be granted a larger share of the final patent value.
In fact, such a change is clearly growth improving from a steady state perspective: in the
long run the new steady state is characterized by a higher rate of growth (i.e. of aggregate
innovation), a higher skill premium, a higher fraction of population choosing to educate
themselves (“college students”37) and a higher aggregate human capital. A higher value of
β means a higher fraction of the final invention appropriated by the basic researcher who
invented its basic research pre-requisite and a lower value of the final product appropriated
by the applied researcher who invented its commerciable version. Therefore basic research
is becoming more profitable (higher “Basic Patent Value”, vB ) and applied research less
profitable. Consequently basic research employment increases—both at the aggregate (“Basic
Research”) and at the industry (“Nb”) level—and applied research employment decreases
both at the aggregate (“Applied R&D”) and at the industry (“Na”) level. A consequence of
this is that in the long run the stock market value (v1L ) of an A1 monopolist increases—as it
faces less obsolescence—while the long run stock market value (v0L ) of an A0 monopolist
gets closer to v1L , as it faces more obsolescence at the basic research stage. Since the positive
incentives to basic R&D outweigh the negative incentives to applied R&D, R&D as a whole
becomes more profitable and more skilled labour is demanded. Therefore the skill wage, wH ,
increases, thereby inducing a larger fraction of the population to enrol at university. This will
gradually increase the supply of human capital and decrease the supply of unskilled labour.
37 To save space in the main text, we have relegated the analytics of the dynamics of the college students to
College population section in Appendix.
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In the transitional dynamics, it is important to notice that as the change in the long-
term court orientation β¯ was not forecast by the private actors until period 40, all the stock
variables—β(t), h(t) , L(t), and m(A0(t))—are predetermined, and for example by Eq.
(10), π(t) is constant. Hence only jump variables such as prices, wages, and employment
change abruptly38 as soon as the transition starts.39 Being β(t) monotonically increasing,
the relative incentive of basic research gradually increases. However, the dynamics of β(t)
interacts with the intrinsically dynamic nature of the R&D process, in a way that is not
captured by the mere comparative statics of steady state analysis: in fact, the expectation
of higher future values of β(t) certainly favours current basic research—the completion
of which will take place in the future—without harming current applied R&D with the
same intensity. In a discrete time approximation of our continuous time framework, we
can imagine that basic and applied research complete—with an endogenous probability—in
each period: the arrival of a still higher β in period 41 is associated with the announcement
of a higher β next period (at 42) and later. However, next period’s β will not penalize
current applied R&D, while instead encouraging current basic research—which is promised
a higher share of the future discovery. In our continuous time framework the same effect
is at work via the right-continuous derivatives:
·
β(t) > 0 favours the expectedly later fruits
of basic research more than it reduces the expectedly earlier gains of applied research. As
a consequence, aggregate R&D is favoured, and the increase in the demand for nB(t) is
matched by a lower decrease in the demand for n A(t), which implies that the difference
m(A0(t))nB(t) − [1 − m(A0(t))] n A(t) increases and must be matched by a decrease in
x(t): the increase in the net demand for R&D labour can be satisfied only by a decrease
in the manufacturing skilled-labour employment. This temporary excess demand for skilled
labour is the reason for the immediate increase in the skill premium. As time passes, the
increase in wH (t) will encourage marginally less able students to enroll to college, thereby
leading to a future increase in the aggregate supply of human capital and to a partially
offsetting effect on wH (t). However, as long as β(t) keeps increasing the demand for R&D
labour continues to grow, though the decline in
·
β(t) will eventually correct the previously
mentioned intertemporal asymmetry that favoured basic research more than it disincentived
applied R&D.
Quite interestingly, the dynamics of human capital seems to have a kink at t+80, as does
unkilled labour. This is due to the fact that the uniformely larger fraction of college students
enrolled relative to the previous steady state (which is a result of the uniformely higher skill
premium) drives up the human capital of the next cohorts (after the training delay) until the
whole labour force has changed in finite time, i.e. in 40 periods. This implies that the growth
of human capital and the decrease in unskilled labour will suddenly stop. If the evolution
of the skill premium was not so strong the dynamics of the unskilled labour and of human
capital would be more smoothed.40
In the generality of simulations we have undertaken, the aggregate innovation rate
decreases in an initial period following the policy switch, whose length depends on the
assigned parameters: the economic reason is that R&D is shifting upstream towards basic
research, thereby reducing applied R&D; this slows down the completion of existing basic
38 These variables are: vB , nB , n A , v0L , v
1
L , w , and the variables simultaneously linked to them, i.e. “Basic
Research”, “Applied R&D”, and x .
39 Even though this is not always clearly visible given the small units in Fig. 1. For example, “Basic Patent
Value” has a fast increase in the period 41, and then its evolution becomes gradual, but this is hardly discernible
by the eye. Similarly for “Basic Research”.
40 As will be the case of Fig. 7.
123
J Econ Growth (2014) 19:183–219 209
Fig. 7 Growth harming transition
research projects, which has a negative effect on innovation. However, in the case of Fig. 6,
in the longer run, the increase in the flow of basic research results will more than compensate
a thinner applied R&D effort.
Our stylized representation suggests that policy makers should not lose their optimism
about innovation enhancing policies based on shorter term R&D reallocation effects coupled
with the inevitably slow improvements in the population educational choices.
The transitional dynamics plotted in the next Fig. 7 is based on the assumption that the
initial value of β¯ was 0.55 and it suddenly changes to 0.65. Such a change will be detrimental
to long term growth,41 because the basic research patent owner gets entitled to too large a
share of the final invention value. This discourages applied R&D too much, which more than
offsets the increase in basic research. Therefore the demand for skilled labour will fall and
so will the skill premium and education.
Interestingly, the stock market value of both monopolists—i.e. both v0L(t) and v
1
L (t)—
increase in this scenario. The slight increase in v0L(t) is due to the lower expected obso-
lescence of the next stage (i.e. lower n A(t)) combined with the expected increase in the
manufacturing profits, which will result from fewer people choosing to educate them-
selves42; these offset the increased industrial obsolescence of the first stage (i.e. higher
nB(t)).
41 We remind the reader that with these parameters—already used in Fig. 3—the growth-maximizing level
of β¯ is 0.5490.
42 See Eq. (10).
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Fig. 8 Growth enhancing transition
We remark that the short term reactions of the skill premium and of manufacturing pro-
duction could inspire wrong interpretations of the true long term effect of normative changes.
In fact, as in the previous discussion, upon impact all stock variables are given, and mainly
short term announcement effects prevail. Most notably, the expected gradual increase in β(t)
fails to penalize current applied R&D in the order of magnitude as it favours current basic
research: basic R&D will be entitled to a larger share of the results of future applied R&D,
not those of current applied R&D. Such temporary win-win situation boosts aggregate R&D
labour and therefore raises the skill premium. However, as
·
β(t) sets in, the temporary relief
for applied R&D disappears, and its smaller share of the final product patent penalizes it so
much that the ensuing drop in R&D employment outweighs the increase in basic research
employment—the whole effect being corroborated by the gradual increase in 1−m(A0(t))—
dragging the skill premium below the initial steady state level and therefore leading towards
the new steady state, characterized by less R&D employment and less innovation.
As a result, our simulations warn policy against relying on empirical evaluations of IPR
changes based on relatively short term effects. The short term effects of a harmful tightening,
respectively relaxation, of the upstream IPR look misleadingly similar to those of a beneficial
bargaining power transfer towards, respectively from, the basic researcher institutions.
The figures shown in this section are considerably robust and representative of the pro-
upstream IPR changes mentioned so far: changing parameters we have observed very similar
patterns of short-run and long-run dynamics.43
43 The files used to generate them are available to the interested readers.
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Fig. 9 Growth harming transition
9.1 An instantaneous change in patent protection
The previous simulations represented a gradual change in court orientation toward basic
research protection, which is certainly characteristic of common law countries. In a civil law
country we would expect a more sudden change in β to β¯: if β rises instantaneously to the new
level, can the negative short-run effect remain? In this section we show Fig. 8, respectively Fig.
9, which feature identical steady state values as the previous Fig. 6, respectively Fig. 7, except
that now at time 41 β changes discountinuously from 0.35 to 0.50—in Fig. 8—and it changes
from 0.55 to 0.65 in Fig. 9. As the reader can see from both figures, in the short run a stronger
basic research protection always looks bad for aggregate innovation. We have run several
simulations with different parameter values, and always obtained the same qualitative pattern.
10 Conclusions
The possibility that innovators may use their patents to block future innovators, and/or prevent
them from commercialising their products, is a reason for concern not only among academics.
The adoption by the US patent law of a statutory research exemption has been proposed as a
definitive solution to this problem. But, by postponing bargaining between innovators it may
put the downstream inventor at disadvantage: when is this disadvantage socially beneficial?
Can we detect this from the data? This paper has tried to answer these important questions
from a dynamic macroeconomic perspective.
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Since the common law system implies gradual transition to new IPR regimes, we have
studied the whole transitional dynamics. The most important conclusion is that the transition
to a stricter regime does not appear to be monotonic, which shows how assessments based
on short term data could be misleading for policy makers. For example, increases in IPR
may result in a temporary reduction in economic growth, even if they can be beneficial for
long-run growth.
We have also derived an easy to compute approximation of the bargaining power of the
upstream researchers, offering an empirical “rule of thumb” that suggests that the year of the
celebrated Madey vs. Duke University Federal Circuit’s decision, i.e. 2005, marked the apex
of the power of basic innovation patent holders, possibly harmful for growth.
Throughout this paper, we have maintained a closed economy framework. It would be very
interesting to extend our model to an open economy, whereby potentially offsetting effects
may come into play, and contribute to design a more realistic picture, perhaps rendering even
more complicated for policy makers to effectively gauge growth-maximizing research policy
in a dynamic macroeconomy. For example, the stronger or weaker protection of research tools
across contries could direct applied research where the court orientation is less in favour of
basic research, which may offset the potentially beneficial effects of higher basic research
protection.
An important missing aspect of the model, common in the R&D-driven growth literature,
is the neglect of universities as teaching institutions. They are implicitly present only in their
research role, but the extension to the teaching role of universities will certainly be a major
topics for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 From Eqs. (22a) and (22c), we have
β
1 − β =
naB
λ0
(
r
n A
+ λ1
naA
)
(53)
which implies that nB is an increasing function of n A and β , as is nBn A .
Let us rewrite Eq. (11) as π = 1−γ1−α l. Moreover, since l = θ0, Eq. (6) can be rewritten as
wH = Bl− , where B is a constant.
After solving for v0L using Eqs. (22d) and (22e), and in light of the above-mentioned
results, we can rewrite Eq. (22c) as:
B
l −  = λ1n
−a
A
1 − γ
1 − α
l (1 − β)
r + λ0n1−aB
[
1 + λ0n
1−a
B
r + λ1n1−aA
]
. (54)
Equations (53) and (54) imply, by the implicit function theorem, that l is a function of
l (n A, nB , β) increasing in all its three arguments.
From l = θ0, we can rewrite Eqs. (22a, 22b, 22c, 22d, 22e) as
h(l) = Q [(1 − l2) + 2(l − 1)] ,
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where Q is a constant. Notice that h′(l) > 0 in the relevant range, because in equilibrium
l > . Equations (23) and (24) imply that:
λ1 + λ0 nBn A
λ0 + λ1
(
n A
nB
)1−a n A = h(l) −
α
1 − α
l(l − )
B
. (55)
Notice that the right hand side of Eq. (55) is decreasing in l, and therefore decreasing in
n A, nB , and β. Instead, the left hand side of Eq. (55) is increasing in n A and β.44 Therefore,
by the implicit function theorem, n A will be an increasing function of β. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1 From Eqs. (68) and (25) follows that the steady state level of human
capital per-capita is an increasing function of the skilled premium wH , which we can write
as h(wH ).
Plugging Eq. (40) into the skilled labour market clearing condition (11) yields:
[
m(A0) + (1 − m(A0))
(
λ1
λ0
1 − β
β
) 1
a
]
nB = h(wH ) − x(wH ) ≡ (wH ) (56)
with  ′(wH ) > 0. Inserting Eqs. (42) into (56) we obtain:
nB
β
[
1 +
(
λ0
λ1
) 1
a
(
β
1−β
) 1−a
a
] = h(wH ) − x(wH ) ≡ (wH ) (57)
Plugging (39) and Eq. (41) into Eqs. (14a) and (40) we obtain:
wH = λ0n−aB βv0L = λ0n−aB β
[(
λ1
λ0
) 1
a
(
1 − β
β
) 1−a
a + 1
]
v1L (58a)
π = λ1n1−aA v1L = λ1
(
λ1
λ0
1 − β
β
) 1−a
a
n1−aB v
1
L (58b)
From the definition of profits and the steady state mass of unskilled labour, we know that
π = π(wH ), with π ′(wH ) < 0. Dividing the last two equations side by side implies:
nB
1
β
[
1 +
(
λ0
λ1
) 1
a
(
β
1−β
) 1−a
a
] = π(wH )
wH
. (59)
Plugging (59) into (57) gives:
1 = (wH ) wH
π(wH )
≡ (wH ) (60)
where ′(wH ) > 0. Therefore there exists a unique steady state level of the skill premium
obtained as the solution to Eq. (60). It is important to notice that, in this example, the steady
state skill premium is independent of β.
44 Remember that we have previously proved that nB and
nB
n A
are increasing functions of n A and β.
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The steady state innovation rate can be rewritten, after using (59), as:
λ0n
1−a
B m(A0) =
[
π(wH )
wH
]1−a
β1−a
[
1 +
(
λ0
λ1
) 1
a
(
β
1−β
) 1−a
a
]a (61)
=
[
π(wH )
wH
]1−a
[(
1
λ0
) 1
a
(
1
β
) 1−a
a +
(
1
λ1
) 1
a
(
1
1−β
) 1−a
a
]a (62)
The numerator does not change with β as previously proved. The innovation rate is
maximized when the denominator is minimized. Hence we need to find a value of β such
that
(
1
λ0
) 1
a
(
1
β
) 1−a
a +
(
1
λ1
) 1
a
(
1
1−β
) 1−a
a is minimized, which implies expression (43 ). unionsq.
10.1 Labour supply and education dynamics
10.1.1 Unskilled labor supply
As previously shown, individuals born at t with ability θ(t) ∈ [0, θ0(t)] optimally choose
not to educate themselves, thereby immediately joining the unskilled labour force. Hence a
fraction θ0(t) of cohort t remains unskilled their whole life. Summing up over all the older
unskilled who are still alive—hence born in the time interval [t − D, t]—we obtain the total
stock of unskilled labour as of time t :
L(t) =
t∫
t−D
bN (s)θ0(s)ds = b
t∫
t−D
egsθ0(s)ds
where b is the birth rate, N (s) is the population at time s.
To stationarize variables, we divide by current (time t) population egs , obtaining:
l(t) ≡ L(t)
N (t)
= b
t∫
t−D
eg(s−t)θ0(s)ds.
Its steady state level is:
l = b 1 − e
g(−D)
g
θ0 = θ0.
The change in the stock of the population-adjusted stock of unskilled labour is obtained
by derivating l(t) with respect to time:
l˙(t) = bθ0(t) − be−gDθ0(t − D) − gl(t) (63)
As in Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Boucekkine et al. (2007) we obtain a crucial role for
delayed differential equations.
10.1.2 College population
The individuals born in t with ability θ(t) ∈ [θ0(t), 1] optimally choose to educate them-
selves, thereby becoming college students for a training period of duration T r . Hence sum-
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ming up over all the previous cohorts who are still in college—hence born in the time interval
[t − T r, t]—we obtain the total stock of college population as of time t :
C˜(t) = b
t∫
t−T r
N (s)(1 − θ0(s))ds = b
t∫
t−T r
egs(1 − θ0(s))ds.
In per-capita terms:
c˜(t) ≡ C˜(t)
N (t)
= b
t∫
t−T r
N (s)
N (t)
(1 − θ0(s))ds = b
t∫
t−T r
eg(s−t)(1 − θ0(s))ds. (64)
In a steady state:
c˜ = b 1 − e
g(−T r)
g
(1 − θ0). (65)
Taking the derivative of Eq. (64) with respect to time we obtain:
.
c˜(t) = b (1 − θ0(t)) − be−gT r (1 − θ0(t − T r)) − gc˜(t). (66)
10.1.3 Human capital
The stock of skilled workers will coincide with those students who have completed their
education and are still alive, born in [t − D, t − T r ]:
H˜(t) = b
t−T r∫
t−D
N (s)(1 − θ0(s))ds = bN (t)
t−T r∫
t−D
eg(s−t)(1 − θ0(s))ds
The total workforce (including students) in equilibrium equals total population, hence:
L(t) + H˜(t) + C˜(t) = egt .
Due to heterogeneous learning abilities, in order to obtain the aggregate skilled labour
supply, we need to multiply each skilled worker by the average amount of human capital that
she can supply, given by the average skill of her cohort net of dispersion parameter :
1∫
θ0(t)
(θ − ) 1
1 − θ0(t)dθ =
1 + θ0(t) − 2
2
.
Therefore the aggregate amount of skilled labour in efficiency units (skilled labor supply)
is:
H(t) = bN (t)
t−T r∫
t−D
eg(s−t)(1 − θ0(s)) (1 + θ0(s) − 2)
2
ds
Dividing by time t population, we can express per-capita human capital as:
h(t) ≡ H(t)
N (t)
= b
2
t−T r∫
t−D
eg(s−t)(1 − θ0(s)) (1 + θ0(s) − 2) ds. (67)
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The steady state value is:
h = b
[
eg(−T r) − eg(−D)] (1 − θ0) (1 + θ0 − 2)
2g
(68)
The dynamics of human capital can be studied by derivating both sides of Eq. (67) with
respect to time:
.
h(t) = −gh(t) + b
2
e−gT r (1 − θ0(t − T r)) (1 + θ0(t − T r) − 2) −
+b
2
e−gD(1 − θ0(t − D)) (1 + θ0(t − D) − 2) . (69)
10.2 Transitional properties of educational choice
The study of the transition dynamics of this model is complicated by the skilled/unskilled
labour dynamics and by the endogenous education choice under perfect foresight. Key to
the solution is the transformation of the integral equation for the ability threshold level for
education into a set of differential equations.
Defining the present value of the unskilled wage incomes as WU (t) =
∫ t+D
t e
− ∫ st i(τ )dτ ds
and the present value of the skilled wage income as WS(t) =
∫ t+D
t+T r e
− ∫ st i(τ )dτwH (s)ds, we
know from (24) that
θ0(t) =  + WU (t)WS(t) . (70)
Defining
R1(t) = e−
∫ t+D
t i(τ )dτ , and (71)
R2(t) = e−
∫ t+T r
t i(τ )dτ (72)
we can write:
W˙U (t) = R1(t) − 1 + i(t)WU (t) (73)
W˙S(t) = R1(t)wH (t + D) − R2(t)wH (t + T r) + i(t)WS(t). (74)
Differentiating Eqs. (71)–(72) with respect to time we obtain:
R˙1(t) = R1(t)(i(t) − i(t + D)), and (75)
R˙2(t) = R2(t)(i(t) − i(t + T r)). (76)
These equations allow us to cast our model in a framework that can be studied in terms
of delayed differential equations.
10.3 Expenditure and manufacturing dynamics
From Eq. (10) follows:
γ − 1
γ
e(t) = (γ − 1) 1
1 − α l(t). (77)
Log-differentiating with respect to time, using Euler equation (3) and the unskilled law
of motion (63) yield:
i(t) − (ρ + g) = e˙(t)
e(t)
= l˙(t)
l(t)
= bθ0(t) − be
−gDθ0(t − D)
l(t)
− g (78)
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that—since r(t) = i(t) − g—can be rewritten as
r(t) − ρ = bθ0(t) − be
−gDθ0(t − D)
l(t)
− g, (79)
In the steady state: r(t) = ρ.
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